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ABSTRACT
1'his paper addresses the effects of present and proposed
Government patent policies on the process of technology trans-
fer and the commercir-Iization of inventions resulting from
Government sponsored•esearch.
The function of the patent system in Government research
and the value of patents resulting from Government sponsored
research are examined.
Three alternative patent policies--title in the
contractor, title in the Government, and the waiver policy--
are examined in terms of their effects on the commercializa-
tion of inventions, industrial competition, disclosure of
inventions, participation of research contractors and admin-
istrative costs.
Efforts to reform the present Government patent policy
are also described.
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introduction
The problems with the present patent policy for federally
funded R&D- (1) lack of uniformity in- individual agency
policies, and (2) a very low rate of commercialization--are
fairly well agreed upon, but which approach offers the best
solution is still being debated with the same arguments as in
1949. But the following factors point to an increasing mo-
mentum towards some means of resolution:
--the growing concern and the resulting administrative
domestic policy review over the declining rate of
U.S. technological innovation;
--the recent presidential proposal for a uniform
Government patent policy allowing contractors to
retain exclusive licenses to resulting inventions; and
--the introduction of four bills during the 95th Congress
dealing exclusively with the Government's patent policy.
The present movement in Congress to reform the Government's
Patent Policy has been a long and slow moving process. Present
efforts to establish a uniform policy date back to the rapid
build up of government sponsored research during the second
world war. Congressional patent policy guidance since that
time has oscillated between a policy where the Government ob-
tains title to all inventions arising from Government research
contracts (the "title policy") and a policy where the contractor
retains the title to such inventions while the Government ob-
tains a paid-up, irrevocable license to use the invention
(the "license policy").
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The Carter administration recently announced its proposed
Government patent policy which would allow small businesses
and non-profit corporations to retain title to resulting in-
ventions while allowing large corporations the right to obtain
only an exclusive license to resulting inventions and only
within a designated "field of use." This proposal is currently
only a recommendation and has not been issued as a binding
executive order.
There are two dis'_, inct views of the function of the
patent system--as a reward for an inventor's creativity or as
an incentive for the creation, development and commerciali-
zation of inventions. This paper addresses only the latter
since it is this function that is important in the process of
technology utilization.
The patent system was adopted in the United States to
"promote the progress of science and the useful arts."[1] it
accomplishes this function by providing the inventor with an
exclusive right (in essence a property right) to the use of
his invention. The patent system attempts to thereby en-
courage inventiveness, development and commercialization of
inventions and the reporting of new inventions and hence the
widespread public availability of new technological ideas.
There are two interpretations of the incentive function
of the patent system; first, that the patent increases the
incentives for people to invent socially useful (i.e.,profitable)
patentable technologies and that it also increases the in-
centives to develop, test and market (i.e., commercialize)
these inventions.
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Outside of Government sponsored research, the patent
system's influence on calculated profit may direct the in-
ventor's activity into channels of general. usefulness. [2]
But under Government res^;arch contracts, where the area and
amount of research are fairly well.-defined prior to the
research, the major determinant of the number of useful
inventions is the quality of the researchers sponsored and
the level of Government funding. The ability of a contractor
or specific inventor to obtain the patent righ-s to the
resulting inventions is unlikely to greatly alter the type or
quality of the research.
The more important incentive provided by patents in
Government sponsored research is the incentive for the patent
recipient to promote or perform the invention's commerciali-
zation and thus reap the benefits offered by the patent rights.
This function has also been called the prospect function [3],
since it is closely analogous to the American mineral claim
system or homesteading system on public lands. The function
of each is to promote the utilization of an otherwise public
resource at an efficient rate which maximizes the amount of
the social benefits produced.
This argument rests upon the assumptions that the $30
billion of Government sponsored research produces patentable
inventions that have social value and that the ability of an
inventor to capture a larger share of the invention's social
benefits as profits increases the probability of the invention's
3
commercialization. Since social benefits are the sum of
producer and consumer surplus, the profits made by the in-
ventor still are a benefit to society. Viewed in this way,
if a license policy increases the probability that a socially
useful invention will be made commercially available as com-
pared to a title policy, then it results in greater social
benefits and should therefore be preferred. Therefore, the
claim that a license policy is a "giveaway" of public property
seems unreasonable although part of the Social benefits will
temporarily be in the form of private profits.
The two primary arguments against the incentive function
are,that patents are only a minor inducement to private firms
to develop and commercialize inventions in comparison to factors
such as the expected commercial value of the invention, and
the cost of developing the invention, and secondly that any
social benefits resulting from the patent system are outweighed
by the costs resulting from the dislocation of resources caused
by the patent system.
The dislocation costs refer to the outputs lost when
resourcesare diverted to the inventing of patentable ideas from
their previous use.
"insofar as inducement (to inventive activity) is
furnished only by the expectation of a patent
monopoly, a diversion of resources takes place and
other production is foregone. What grounds are
there for concluding that the output induced by
this type of monopoly has any greater claim to
be regarded as 'generally useful' than that which
would have been induced in its absence by the open
market?" [4]
r .
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The Value of Patents Resulting from Governm t Sponsored
Research
There are a number of misconceptions regarding the number
and value of the patents resulting from Government funded
research which have traditionally overestimated both the num-
ber and the value of these patents. As an example, there were
.41 inventions per million dollars of NASA research, funded
in 1978 (NASA R&D expenditures in 1978 » $3.011 billion,
1978 invention disclosures = 1239), There were .074 inventions
on which patent applications were filed per million dollars
of research and .04.4 inventions on which patents were granted
(assuming the Patent Office's historical .6 ratio of patents
granted to applications filed) per million dollars of research.
From this small number of patented inventions different
studies have shown that from 1-20% of these will be commercially
used and even a smaller number will yield any income.
The incomes yielded from those commercialized have usually
been quite moderate. Therefore the expected value of the
patentable inventions resulting from NASA sponsored research
has been quite low. Similar results can also be found in
private firms, Research Corporation, and others although
the rates of both disclosure per dollar of research and com-
mercialization of inventions disclosed have been somewhat higher.
Therefore, the claims that Government contractors that
obtain patent rights may make millions of dollars is not
supported in fact. Nor is the claim that the Government
ownership of rights to inventions results in multimillion
5
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dollar losses. But this is not to say that patent rights do
not provide a relatively important incentive to private
firms to commercialize these inventions. This relatively
high perceived value of this incentive can be seen in the very
active support many private firms have given to policies which
allow the contractor to obtain exclusive rights to the invention.
Analysis of Alternative Patent Policies
This section of the paper examines the policies---the
title policy, the license policy, and NASA's present waiver
policy—upon the basis of the costs and benefits resulting from
each policy. The costs and benefits are broken down into the
policies' effects in five sectors:
• commercialization or utilization of inventions,
• competition,
• participation of contractors in Government research,
• disclosure of inventions, and
• administrative coats of the program.
This report does not place quantitative values on these costs
and benefits because of the unavailability of sufficient data
to give reliability to such results.
Commercialization of inventions
The effect of Government patent policy on the rate of
utilization of Government sponsored inventions has traditionally
been the most important issue in the debate between advocates
of the title and license policies. Commercialization is
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important because it is the major means by which an in )n-
tion reaches the public and its advantages (cost reduction,
increased product quality, ...) are transfolmed into social
benefits. Most supporters of the license policy have claimed
that the increased likelihood of commercialization of inven-
tions is the greatest advantage in allowing contractors to
retain exclusive rights to their inventions. This argument is
based on the assumptions that most high technology companies
are more capable of promoting the dissemination and use of in-
ventions than the Government and that exclusive rights provide
a necessary incentive, * bring forth the risk capital necessary
for the development, marketing, and cortimerci.alization of new
inventions. Title policy proponents have responded that not
only are patents a minoz, determinant in corporate decisions to
commercialize inventions, but the potential inability of inter-
ested future developers to gain access to the technology results
in an actual decrease in the likelihood of commercialization.
License Policy Arguments:
There are two major arguments behind the position that
the ability of contractors to retain title to inventions will
increase the rate of commercialization of Government sponsored
inventions;	 ,
o a patent provides a contractor with the exclusive
right to license or use an invention, resulting in
a reduction of the risks accompanying its develop-
ment and commercialization and thereby increasing
a w
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the incent.;Mes for the investment of the necessary
risk capital,
o contractors who have retained title to inventions
have been more successful at commercializing those
inventions than the sponsoring agency in part
because of their closer tie to the marketplace and
prospective developers (oftentimes the contractors
themselves) and the possession of a product "champion"
(the inventor himself).
The first of these two arguments is based upon the
"prospect" theory of a patent (discussed in the previous section).
T
hi s
s .a^ tn	 uT	 -- of the patent system env a fhns the patent, not as av
reward for past inventiveness, but as a necessary incentive to
develop, test, and use or market an invention. Traditionally,
the cost required for development and commercialization of an
invention have been an order of magnitude (or more) larger than
the basic research costs. For NASA inventions, the private
or public utilization of space technology usually requires
large costs in adaptive engineering, development and marketing.
By reducing the risk of other companies appropriating the
results of this process of commercialization, patents provide
a greater incentive for contractors to invest capital and, as
the Harbridge House Study on Government Patent Policy pointed
out, it is the lack of full technical development of Government
inventions that has been the most frequent and important barrier
to industrial use (5). A patent does not disallow others from
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using a patented technology, it only demands that they
negotiate. a reasonable payment for its use Faith the patent
owner.
One result of this incentive is an increase in the amount
of private resources being expended on technological innovation,
an increase which most economists have regarded as being im-
portant both in reversing the declining levels of U.S. pro-
ductivity and in modernizing technological industries that
have fallen behind foreign competitors.
In support of the second argument, there is statistical
evidence that contractors actually have been substantially
Tore successful than the Government in promoting the commer-
cialization of Governm,-nt sponsored inventions, either through
inter-corporate licensing or in-house development. Of the
over 1200 NASA inventions to which contractors have obtained
title since 1959, approximately 16% have been commercialized
(Appendices B and C). in comparison, of the over 3500 inventions
to which the Government has acquired patents since 1959, only
1% have been commercialized (Appendices D and E).
:.
These figures are subject to question because of the
difficulty in obtaining data many years after initial in-
vention, the variation in definitions of "commercialization"
and the statistical bias caused by contractors requesting
the most commercially attractive inventions under a waiver
policy. This variation is indicated in Appendix F showing the
results of five different studies of the commercialization of
NASA inventions. The most reliable data is probably that
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compiled by NASAs patent and licensing office, since their
data gathering techniques are the most extensive and their
definitions have been subject to only minor variations over time
(Appendices B, C, D, and E).
These higher rates of commercialization by contractors
are caused in 'part by contractors requesting waivers on the
commercially valuable inventions, but there are a number of
other factors also involved. Contractors are usually chosen
because of their being the most qualified in a certain field
of research and, therefore, they are often in the best position
to promote the commercialization of inventions in that field.
These companies or universities as a result usually have much
closer ties to the marketplace than do the sponsoring agencies.
These contractors are also guided by the profits that in-
ventions can offer to channel their investments into areas
of public usefulness. They also have greater freedom in the
types of license agreements that they can subsequently negotiate
with other users of the invention.
Contractors also already have a "product champion" since
it is usually the inventor that has the greatest interest in
seeing an invention actually developed and utilized. It is
widely believed that the transfer of a technology from one
organization to another requires the transfer of people familiar
with the technology. One obvious solution is to provide in-
ventions to the organization possessing the technology to
develop it themselves. Patent rights provide this type of
incentive.
10
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It is interesting to note that the patent attorneys at
several agencies, including agencies which now pursue a waiver
policy, have informally supported the use of a license policy
in almost all Government research contracts (Appendix G).
Title Policy. Arguments:
There are three major arguments against contractors
being allowed to retain title to inventions in order to
encourage commercialization:
o patents play a minor role in determining corporate
decisions to commercialize inventions in comparison
to factors such as favorable price conditions, the
state of business confidence and costs of capital;
o contractors retaining title to Government sponsored
inventions are oftentimes interested in only making
sure that their competitors don't use the inventions,
thereby decreasing the likelihood of commercialization;
o it is impossible to show that the gains from the
movement of people and funds to the development of
patentable inventions are not offset by losses in
other areas of output--specifically the development
of non-patentable inventions.
Waiver Policy Arguments:
The waiver policies adoped by NASA, DOE, NSF, and HEW have
offered several advantages. They are flexible and therefore
allow contractors interested in commercializing an invention
a chance (a 76% chance at NASA) to obtain exclusive rights to
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an identified .invention. In those cases where the contractor
has not expressed an interest in the invention, or the waiver
has been denied, the Government then has the opportunity to
seek out other possible users on an exclusive or non-exclusive
basis. Such a flexible system initially appears to offer the
advantages of both the license and title policies, but there
are a number of disadvantages as well.
It is obviously impossible for NASA's invention or Con-
tribution Board or DOB's patent office or any other Government
entity responsible for waiver decisions to be able to know what
the necessary factors are in an invention's commercialization.
Commercialization is dependent upon a number of complex
unknowns such as future market demand, the quality of the
invention, and the companies interest in the invention. Also
present waiver guidelines support Government retention of
title in cases where the "principal purpose of the contract is
to create, develop or improve products, processes or methods
which are intended for commercial use" or "which directly con-
cern public health, public safety or public welfare," areas
where it seems incentives to commercialize the inventions are
the most important (see Appendix A).
Past records also show that many contractors perceive
the waiver process as cumbersome and resulting in a waste
of both time and money. Processing time for a waiver by NASA
can vary from several weeks to a year depending upon the
perceived urgency of the request. A waiver must also be
12
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accompanied by a general outline of the contractor's proposed
plan for the invention's commercialization. For large com-
panies familiar with NASA's waiver process, the waiver requests
do not pose a high cost. But ^(.,,Y small companies or those
unfamiliar with the waiver pr'^r,:t^: :is, the costs of a waiver request
may appear to be very substantial. Some NASA contractors have
reported that they were unaware that waivers were even granted.
Another problem with the waiver system is that it intro-
daces a factor of uncertainty in the commercialization process.
An example of this uncertainty is provided by the changes
that took place in HEW in 1978. Up until that time, HEW
had followed a policy of granting most waiver requests to
universities and small businesses (under Institutional Patent
Agreements). Many contractors had participated in HEW con-
tracts with this expectation, but in 1978 Secretary Califano
called for a review of all future waivers and essentially
froze all future waivers.
Effects on Industrial Competition
opponents of a license policy have argued that the
ability of contractors to retain patent rights has resulted
in the formation of product monopolies, the increase of product
costs to the consumer, and the lessening of market competition.
Although patent rights do permit the private capture of returns
created by the use of a patented invention, they by no means
assure it. In fact, past studies have shown no significant
examples of monopolization resulting from patents obtained on
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Government sponsored inventions with the most extensive patent
policy study concluding "that undue concentration would result
from the license policy is a possibility so negligible that
it may be disregarded" [6] .
The main reason that contractor retained patents have
not resulted in monopolization is, as previously mentioned, that
there are few patented inventions of sufficient quality to
allow the capture of a market. It is interesting to note
that in thirty-four antitrust cases studied by the Harbridge
House, where forced licensing of the defendent's patent
portfolio had been one of the economic remedies for restraint
of trade, only two companies in the survey have ever received
applications for licenses although the patent portfolios were
in some cases as large as 300 patents [7] .
Monopolization has also not occurred because contractors
have in general been very willing to license the use of their
inventions to other users. In fact licensing has oftentimes
provided the contractor with the most valuable means of op-
timizing the value of the patent, either in addition to or in
place of,in-house development.
A more reasonable concern than monopolization is that
a few valuable inventions will be neither utilized nor promoted
by the contractor. Since NASA currently publishes Tech Briefs
and Technical Support Packages on contractor-owned patents
arising from NASA sponsored research, :his lack of use is
presently minimized.
a r
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It should also be noted that the Government presently
has a means of protecting against monopolization, "excessive
profits" or non-use of an invention in the form of "march-
in-rights." March-in-rights give the sponsoring agency the
right either to require the contractor to license an invention
to another company at a reasonable rate or to license the
invention itself under certain limited conditions. Although
march-in-rights have never been enforced, it seems that they
could be used effectively in the few situations where they
might be needed.
of several agency patent counsels interviewed, a
few stated that for march-in-rights to be effective the
sponsoring agency must monitor the contractors'use of the
invention through the submission of a contractor's invention
utilization report. The submission of the utilization reports
was said also to increase the likelihood of the contractor
using the invention by encouraging a careful assessment of the
invention's commercial value. Such a monitoring program could
result in enforcement through the action of the contractor's
competitors who could, in the case of valuable inventions,
monitor their .misuse and request the Government to enforce
its march-in-rights.
It has also been suggested that when a contractor has not
used the invention after a certain number of years that the
patent rights should be transferred back to the sponsoring agency,
so that it can promote the invention's utilization. However, such
a proposal is plagued by the problem of defining a "reasonable
15
period of time" and what constitutes use of an invention.
Participation of Contractors
The willingness of a contractor to participate in
Government sponsored research is highly dependent upon two
factors: the contractor's perceived value of any resulting
patents to which he may retain exclusive rights and the
reasons a company enters into Government, sponsored research.
For those companies that regard patents as an essential
form of protection in developing a new product, the title
policy may oftentimes deter the company from entering into a
Government research contract. Past studies have shown that
such companies are not in the majority and are concentrated
in industries which are technologically based but innovate at
a moderate rate (excluding rapidly innovative industries whore
trade secrets provide a more effective means of protection).
Puny companies, especially large corporations., have
traditionally regarded patents as being essentially defensive
in nature (i.e., means of avoiding lawsuits for infringement
by other companies who later patent a similar invention). For
these companies, gaining exclusive rights to Government spon-
sored inventions has little value since the Government does
not enforce infringement on the patents that it owns. The
participation of those companies which see patents as having
neither offensive nor defensive value are essentially un-
affected by Government patent policy although several such
companies have nonetheless vigorously supported a license policy.
n 1
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Those companies which do value patent rights might be
cted to Lower their contract bids under a License policy
n amount proportional to the perceived value of the ex-
ive rights in any future inventions, although there has
no good evidence to substantiate such a belief. The value
otential patents rights to a contractor before performance
he contract are estimated to be worth less than one dollar
for an average one million research contract [a].
Many of the opponents of the title policy have claimed
that that policy's major disadvantage is not the inflated
cost of contractor's research bids but the lower quality of
research that the Government obtains. This lower quality is
due to a number of factors including the refusal of many of
the most qualified contractors to perform Government research.
Surveys of companies have shown that only a few companies
actually refuse to participate because of an agency's patent
policies. Lack of interest in the area of research, unwilling-
ness to transfer the necessary personnel and facilities away
from commercial research and a general unwillingness to work
under Government supervision have been the more common reasons
for qualified contractors not participating in Government
research.
One area where contractor participation has been adversely
affected is in contracts which require the availability to the
public of any background patents; i.e., those privately owned
patents which are deemed necessary for the use of any inventions
17
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resulting from subsequent Government contracts. Companies
have also claimed that participating in Government contracts
has resulted in valuable proprietary information becoming
publicly available because of the Freedom of Information Act
and the requirement for background patents (Appendix G).
There have also been claims that a large number of
contractors segregate their industrial research teams from
their Government research, resulting in a lower quality of
Government research. if corporations' proprietary informa-
tion has been jeopardized, such segregation seems to be a
reasonable response.
NASA's ability to grant advance waivers should decrease
the likelihood of losing the participation of qualified con-
tractors. Advance waivers have been requested from NASA 906
times and granted 463 times between 1958 and 1978. Although
considering how few advance waivers are requested,contractors
apparently either perceive the waiver requests as time consuming
and/or too expensive, or the value of obtaining patents is too
low to justify such requests. Although the waiver request
requires only the completion of a prepared form and the iden-
tification of the contractor's ability to commercialize or
license any resulting inventions, many small companies are
not aware of the process or view it as too expensive. This
can be seen from the fact that the vast majority of NASA
waiver requests come from large companies familiar with NASA's
waiver policies.
\,
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Disclosure of Inventions
All Government research contracts require that contractors
report any resulting inventions to the sponsoring agency. Dis
closuro is considered so important by some that a draft bill
proposed .,by the Departments of commerce and Justice in 1979
recommended criminal sanctions against any contractor not
reporting new inventions. Aside from the complete infeasibility
of such a pro^,osal,* it indicates the fear by some Government
officials that there are contractors who do not disclose in-
ventions they see being commercially valuable and thus de-
crease the social benefits gained from the research.
A high rate of discloalire by itself is not advantageous,
as can be seen from NASA's records. Some companies have
traditionally reported large numbers of inventions that never
proved of any commercial value, while others have only reported
those inventions that they thought to be novel breakthroughs.
Although the cost of screening an invention is not very high,
since 1963 contractors have reported an average of nearly
1800 inventions annually, while only 5% of these have restilted
in patent applications. In comparison, NASA employees have
reported only an average of 335 inventions annually with 34%
resulting in patent applications. It, therefore, is obvious
that promoting disclosures is of and by itself of little value.
* Due to the inability to definatively define what constitutes
an invention or the inability of, for example, a scientist in
one field to recognize that his minor discovery may be a
breakthrough in a completely different field.
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it is not obvious that any patent policy is clearly
advantageous in promoting the disclosure of valuable inventions.
License policy advocates have claimed that the ability to
retain exclusive rights would remove the disincentives for
not reporting inventions. Yet in those contracts where NASA
has granted advance waivers the number of inventions disclosed
per dollar of research has declined substantially, although
much of this is due to the contractor's diminished need to
disclose inventions that are not of a patentable or otherwise
valuable nature.
As the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
matters recently remarked
"We do not believe that disclosure has been a problem
in private R&D contracting situations largely because
of the high costs of concealment and the penalties in
loss of reputation and future business caused by having
concealment later discovered." [9]
Although there is little conclusive evidence to show
that any one patent policy results in a more complete and
effective disclosure of inventions, there is some evidence.
indicating that NASA's attempts to promote disclosures from
contractors have resulted in an excess of disclosures of
inventions that have little or no commercial value, wasting
the time and money of both the contractor and the Government
invention review board. This cost must, of course, be weighed
against the possibility that a few valuable inventions might
otherwise not be reported.
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Administrative Costs
The administrative costs of each of the three Government
patent policies is not very substantial and are unlikely to
be a major factor in choosing between each policy. Nonetheless
changes in policy could offer some cost reductions in comparison
to NASA's waiver policy.
Presently the costs directly and indirectly attributable
to NASA's waiver policy stem from the following activities;
l) compilation of the inventions disclosed by con-
tractors and employees,
2) screening of the inventions by NASA and IITRI,
3) processing and filing of patent applications,
4) compilation of waiver requests,
5) compilation of licensing requests,
6) determination of waiver and "license requests by
the ICB,
7) review of the invention utilization reports, and
8) promotion and description of NASA inventions by the
Technology Utilization office.
The license policy would decrease these administrative
costs by decreasing both the number of inventions that must
be screened for patent applications by the Technology
Utilization office, eliminate the compilation and
determination of waiver requests, decrease the number of
license requests and determinations, and increase the number
of invention utilization reports.
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The title policy would increase the number of inventions
to be screened, patented, licensed, and promoted ar.d would
eliminate the waiver compilation and determinations.
Several critics of NASA's present policy have claimed that
NASA files patent applications on many more patents than are
necessary. Since: the Government only uses patents defensively,
except when it is granting exclusive licenses, publication
will give the same defense against infringement but without
the cost of the patent application processing and filing fees.
22
Appendix A
NASA's Patent System
NASA's patent policy is based upon Section 305 of the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 and the Presidential
Memorandum on Government Patent Policy of 1971 (PRM). NASA's
policy and procedures are detailed in NASA's revised im-
plementing regulations (e.g., NASA Patent Waiver Regulations[10];
NASA Domestic Patent Licensing Regulations [11] ; and NASA
Foreign Patent Licensing Regulations [12]),
NASA's patent policy has evolved into a waiver policy
which retains for the Government a broad, irrevocable royalty-
free license but allows Government contractors to request the
Government to waive its rights to the title of an invention
to the contractor. invention waivers may be requested either
prior to performance of a contract for all resulting inventions
(advance waivers) or after identification of an individual
invention under a given contract. Recommendations on all
waiver requests are made by the 'NASA inventions and Contributions
Board (ICB) to the NASA Administrator although almost no ICB
recommendations have ever been reversed by the Administrator.
Guidelines to be considered by the ICB in considering
waiver requests are outlined in the Space Act, Presidential.
Memorandum of 1971 and the implementing regulations. The
stated objectives of NASA's patent policy are:
23
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serving the public interest;
protecting public health, safety and welfare;
fostering inventiveness;
encouraging reporting of indentions;
providing for the widest possible dissemination of
new technology;
promoting the investment of risk capital in new
inventions;
• promoting industrial competition;
• promoting early utilization of inventions; and
• avoiding undue market concentration.
There are similar guidelines of each Federal agency but
widely varying interpretations of these objectives has resulted
in each Federal department or agency developing a different
patent policy.
Statistically, NASA's policy has been largely one of
title in the Government with contractors acquiring title to
only 4% of the contractor inventions disclosed. [13] This
low percentage of contractor acquired rights is due primarily
to the small number of contractor requests for waivers. Be-
tween 1959 and 1979, 76% of the requests for individuals'
waivers had been granted with 51% of the requests for advance
waivers being granted.
From these figures it would appear that either NASA has
been patenting many inventions that their inventors do not
perceive as having significant commercial potential and for
24
which the Government's rights could probably be just as
effectively protected by publishing, or the process of request-
ing a waiver is or at least appears to contractors to ba an
overly expensive or time consuming obstacle to gaining title
to an invention, or both.
25
NASA'S PATENT POLICY
Tit, le In The Government
1) National Aeronautics and Space Act (1958):
"any invention conceived or actuall y reduced
to practice in the performance of anv work
under any contract... becomes the exclusive
property of the government unless the
Administrator determines that the interests
of the United States will be served b y ul.aiving
all or any part of the Government's rights....
(section 305)
2) Presidential Memorandum (1971):
(a) Where
(1) a principal purpose of the contract is to
create, develop or improve products, processes, or
methods ,which are intended for commercial use (or
which are otherwise intended to be made available
for use) by the general public at home or abroad,
or which will be required for such use by govern-
mental regulations; or
(2) a principal purpose of the contract is
for exploration into fields which directly concern
the public health, public safety, or public
welfare; or
(3) the contract is in a field. of science or
technology in which there has been ;little signifi-
cant experience outside of work funded by the
Government, or where the Government has been the
principal developer of the field, and the ac-
quisition of exclusive rights at the time of con-
tracting might confer on the contractor a preferred
or dominant position; or
(4) the services of the contractor are
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(i) for the operation of a Government-
owned research or production facility; or
(ii) for coordinating and directing the
work of others,
	 (Section 1)
Title In The Contractor
1) National Aeronautics and Space Act;
No such allowance mentioned.
2) Presidential Memorandum:
(b) In other situations, where the purpose of the
contract is to build upon existing , knowledge or
technology, to develop information, products,
processes, or methods for use by the Government,
and the work called for by the contract is in a
field of technology in which the contractor has
acquired technical competence (demonstrated by
factors such as know-how, experience, and patent
position) directly related to an area in which
the contractor has an established nongovernmental
commercial position, the contractor shall normally
acquire the principal or exclusive rights through-
out the world in and to any resulting inventions.
(c) ...the agency may prescribe by .regulation
special situations where the public interest in the
availability of the inventions would best be served
by permitting the contractor to acquire at the time
of contracting greater rights than a nonexclusive
license.	 (Section 1)
3) Institutional Patent Agreements:
In accordance with the language regarding exceptional
circumstances in 51-9 107-3(a) and/or the language
regarding special situations in 91-9 107-3(c), agencies
may enter into Institutional Patent Agreements (see
51-9 107-6(c)) with universities and nonprofit organ-
izations having technology transfer programs meeting
the criteria of 51-9 109-7(b). The agreements permit
those institutions, subject to certain conditions, to
retain the entire right, title, and interest in inven-
tions made in the course of their contracts.
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1) National Aeronautics and Space Act:
(f) Under such regulations in conformity with this
subsection as the Administrator shall prescribe,
he may waive all or any part of the rights of the
United States under this section with respect to
any invention or class of .inventions made or which
may be made by any person or class of persons in
the performance of any work required by any contract
of the Administration of the Administrator determines
that the interests of the United States will be
served thereby.	 (Section 305)
2) Presidential Memorandum:
Advance Waivers
In exceptional circumstances the contractor may
acquire greater rights than a nonexclusive license
at the time of contracting where the head of the
department or agency c ,:rtifies that such action will
best serve the public interest.
	
(Section 1(a) )
...the agency may prescribe by regulation special
situations where t.he public interest in the avail-
ability of the inventions would best be served by
permitting the contractor to acquire at the time of
contracting greater rights than a nonexclusive
license.	 (Section 1.(c) )
Deferred Determination Waivers;
Greater rights may also be acquired by the contractor
after the invention has been identified where the
head of the department or agency determines that the
acquisition of such greater rights is consistent with
the intent of this Section 1(a) and is either a
necessary incentive to call forth private risk capital
and expense to bring the invention to the point of
practical application or that the Government's con-
tribution to the invention is small compared to that
of the contractor. Where an identified invention
made in the course of or under the contract is not a
primary object of the contract, greater rights may
also be acquired by the contractor under the criteria
of Section 1(c).	 (Sectionl(a))
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Appendix R
NASA WAIVER STATISTICS
1959 THROUGH 1978*
individual Waivers
1. Number of inventions reported
by NASA contractors	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 31,357
2. Petitions for waiver requested
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 1,366
3. Waivers	 granted	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 1,035
4. Petitions	 denied	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 148
5. Petitions withdrawn	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 139
6. Petitions	 pending
	
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 44
Advance Waivers
1. Advance waivers requested	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 906
2. Advance waivers granted	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 463
3. Advance waivers denied	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 293
4. Requests withdrawn	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 111
5. Requests	 pending
	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 39
6. Number of inventions reported under
contracts having advance waivers and
contractor intends to file 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 216
Inventions Waived
1. Total inventions waived 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 1,254
Under individual waivers 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 1029
Under advance waivers	 .	 .	 225
2. Inventions for which waivers have been
voided	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 . .	 266
* Statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, NASA Deputy General
Council, before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Science, Technology and Space, July 23, 1979..
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Appendix C
ATION/COMMERCIALIZATION STATISTICS ON WAIVED INVENTIONS*
of Waived Inventions Surveyed:
ercent of Total (788) Active Inventions:
Number of Responses:
ercent Response:
of Inventions Surveyed
Previous Indications of
Probability of Use in 1977-1978
Newly Waived Inventions
121
15
102
84%
Reports	 Reports Percent
R_ etc uested Received Response
	
100
	
83	 83%
	
13
	
12	 92.3%
Nonresponsive to 1977 Request 	 8
Status of Surveyed Inventions
Utilized/Commercialized
(First Use-2 inventions)
Development Efforts Continuing
Licensing/Promotion Only
No Further Development Expected
7	 87.5%
Number of Inventions
7
39
34
22
Total Number of Active s Inventions (Through 1977): 788
Total Number of Inventions Voided:
	
258
Total Number of Inventions Utilized/
Commercialized:	 193 (18.5%)
* See Appendix B
t Waiver not voided
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Appendix D
NASA LICENSING STATISTICS
U.S. PATENTS AND PATENT APPLICATIONS
December 31, 1978*
U.S. PATENTS HELD BY NASA
U.S. Patents and Patent Applications
	
Available for Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 3,512
Employee Inventions . . . . . 	 . . . . . . . .	 2,378
Contractor Inventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,134
NONEXCLUSIVE LICENSES
Licenses Granted to Date . . . . . . . . . .
	
502
Licenses Revoked or Terminated . . 	 . . . . .	 260
Licenses in Force as of this Date . . . . . . .
	
242
Inventions Covered by Licenses in Force . . .
	
124
.
EXCLUSIVE LICENSES
Licenses Granted to Date . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 21
Licenses revoked or Terminated . .	 . .	 12
Licenses in Force as of this Date . . . . . .	 9
Inventions Covered by Licenses in Force . . . . 	 9
Different Licenses . . .	 . . . . . . . . .	 8
* See Appendix B
{ .
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Appendix E
COMMERCIAL USE OF NASA OWNED INVENTIONS
LICENSED BY NASA IN THE UNITED STATES
December 31, 1978*
CLUSIVE LICENSES
Nonexclusive license in force . . . . . . . . . .
Utilization reports received from licensees . . .
POSITIVE USE REPORTS
Reports of commercial use . . . . . . . . . .
inventions covered by these reports . . . . .
Employee inventions . . . . . . . . . .
Contractor inventions . . . . . . . .
242
138
50
34
28
6
NEGATIVE USE REPORTS
Reports of no commercial use .
	 . . .
	 88
Inventions covered by these reports
	 .
	 56
Employee inventions . . . . . . .
	 .
	 40
Contractor inventions . . . . . .
	 . .
	 16
EXCLUSIVE LICENSES
	
EXCLUSIVE LICENSES GRANTED TO DATE . . . . .
	 21
Employee inventions .
	 . . . . . . . . . . . 	 14
Contractor inventions
	 . . . . . . . . . . .	 7
POSITIVE USE REPORTS
	
Reports of commercial use . . . . . . . . . .
	 6
Employee inventions . . . . . . .
	 4
Contractor inventions . . .
	 . . . . .	 2
NEGATIVE USE REPORTS
Reports of no commercial use
	 . . . . . .	 15
Employee inventions . . .
	 . .	 10
	
Contractor inventions . . . . . . . . .
	 5
* See Appendix B
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Appendix G
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
in order to gain a better perspective on industry's
views OF NASA's patent policy, personal interviews were
conducted with the owners of several small firms and patent
attorneys from several medium and large firms that have
performed NASA research in the past. interviews with the
patent counsels from eight Federal agencies (NASA, DOE, DOD,
USDA, HEW, DOI, NSF, DOT), the Office of Federal Procurement
Policv (OFPP), the American Patent Lawyers Association,
Research Corporation, and numerous industry associations
were also conducted.
These interviews proved invaluable in providing
insight into the industry and Government views of alterna-
tive Government patent policies. Findings from these inter-
views have been included in the report where relevant.
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